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Articles
The Honourable
Mr. Justice Gibson

Legal Procedure: Access to
Justice: 1883 to 1983

I. Introduction
The invitation to me, as present Chairman of the Law
Commission for England and Wales, to take part in this centenary
celebration of Dalhousie Law School was both an honour conferred
on our Law Commission and a recognition of our shared heritage of
the common law and of the spirit and endeavour of law reform
shared by the legal systems of Canada and of the United Kingdom.
Greater honour was done to my office and to me by the conferring
of the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws of this great university in
such distinguished company.' This particular honour I shall bear
with pride and delight and gratitude, not caring at all for how little I
personally deserve it or for the gentle astonishment of my judicial
siblings and academic friends at home.
The invitation to deliver this paper referred to a survey, done by
lawyers from Canada, the United States, and Britain, of the
experience of the Anglo-American legal system over the past one
hundred years. First, I must make some disclaimers. The United
Kingdom is a unitary state, but it has three legal systems. I have
worked in that of England and Wales. The law and legal systems of
Scotland and of Northern Ireland are both separate and different. In
particular, the grave problems created for the legal system in
Northern Ireland by the concerted use of violence against the state
and the resort to sectarian killing lie outside my experience and the
scope of this paper.
Next, my work in the law was as a common lawyer at the bar. I
was put in the Queen's Bench Division when appointed a judge in
1977. Since 1981, I have been Chairman of the Law Commission

1. On 28 October 1983, the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws of Dalhousie
University was conferred on the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister
of Canada; on the Honourable Mr. Justice Brian Dickson of the Supreme Court of
Canada; on the Honourable Taslim Elias, President of the International Court of
Justice; and on the Honourable Rachelle Glube, Chief Justice of the Trials Division

of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.
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for England and Wales. My part in this survey must be that of the
practising, rather than of the comparative, lawyer.
The main purpose of our legal system, given substantive laws
which are just, is to secure for every citizen access to justice which
is sufficient, effective, and equal, and to secure for the state
effective and just process against the individual in protection of the
rights of the community. That purpose must be served by sets of
legal rules and it is with those parts of our system that this paper is
concerned. The rules by which the citizen can restrain abuse of
power by the state and enforce the rights which the law gives to
him, and the rules by which the state can proceed against those
suspected of crime, were devised to serve our fundamental ideals.
Rules, however, are to be tested continually, not by what they are
intended to do, but by how well they serve their purpose.
My contribution to this examination of the Canadian-AngloAmerican system of law is to report on some of the work that has
been done in England and Wales to advance this main purpose of
our legal system and on work not yet done which ought to be done.
Some, if not all, of our problems have counterparts in the other
common law systems.
I shall refer to four parts of our legal system in which some of the
strengths and the weaknesses of our tradition are apparent. First is
our law of civil procedure, which requires fundamental reappraisal.
We need to do again what the Victorian Judicature Commissioners
did in the years before the reforms of 1873 to 1883. Second is our
law of criminal evidence and procedure: the slow and steady reform
of old rules has encountered, and still faces, resistance to change
which appears to confuse existing rules with basic principles. Third
is our administrative law, the means by which the citizen should be
protected from abuse of power by the state and public bodies. Here
the judges failed for a time to perform their proper function, but
have now found again in the common law its full capacity for
development. Fourth is our constitutional law itself, the rule of law
which is in good health, but which is by itself no longer sufficient
for the task.
One hundred years ago in England, it was, and for some fifty
years had been, a time of vigorous and effective law reform. The
regulation of society and the advancement of social welfare by
statute law was under way. The civil procedure of the superior
courts and those courts themselves had been entirely reorganized by
the Judicature Acts of 1873 to 1875. These acts imposed on a

Legal Procedure: Access to Justice: 1883-1983 5

number of different courts one structure of judicature, combining
common law and equity, providing new rules of procedure designed
to avoid the defeat of any just claim by technical error, and offering
the latest improvements for pleadings copied from those that had
recently been introduced in the United States. 2 The structure of
criminal procedure, based on trial by lay magistrates for minor
offences and on jury trial for serious offences, was already long
established, with all the common law features of accusatory
process, the right to silence, adversary trial, and exclusionary rules
of evidence. The accused had been allowed counsel in all cases
since 1837, 3 but was prohibited from giving evidence on his own
behalf in all cases until 1898. 4 He had to wait until 1907 for the
creation of an effective right of appeal against conviction for error
5
of law or irregularity and against sentence.
As for our constitution, it was then the cause of great satisfaction.
In 1885, Professor Dicey published his classic exposition of the rule
of law within our system, describing it as a unitary state of which
the basic law is the uncontrolled 6 sovereignty of Parliament. Dicey,
who was contemplating a very different electorate and politics less
polarized than today's, expressed no fear of either the despotism of
an unfettered executive or the elective dictatorship which some in
England, including Lord Hailsham, 7 have seen as the threat
presented by the combination of a sovereign parliament and by the
workings of our elective system, which is based upon a simple
majority in single-member constituencies. Professor Wade has
described that elective system as probably the worst that could be
devised, 8 but two of our major political parties persist in admiring
it.
In 1885, the first federal government within the British
Commonwealth - that of Canada - was eighteen years old and
was functioning under what was then the British North America
Act, 1867. In the first volume of the Law Quarterly Review that
year, Dicey commented upon federal limited government in terms
2. Sir Jack Jacob, Q.C., The Reform of Civil Procedural Law (Sweet & Maxwell:
1982) p. 315. Also see Professor Jolowicz, General Ideas and the Reform of Civil
Procedure (October 1983) Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 227, 235.
3. 7 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 114.
4. Criminal Evidence Act. 1898.
5. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907.
6. McCawley v. The King (1920) A.C. 691, 704.
7. The Dilemma of Democracy (1978).
8. H.W.R. Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens: 1980) p. 9.
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which revealed no envy of those who enjoyed it. "Federal
government means weak government," he said. "The distribution
of powers among co-ordinate authorities necessarily leads to the
result that no one authority can wield the same amount of power as,
under a Unitarian constitution, is possessed by the Sovereign. The
federation will be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states
of equal resources." 9 He explained that the apparent security that
the United States of America had enjoyed to that date under a
federal constitution did not invalidate his conclusion, because the
United States had no powerful neighbours and had no foreign policy
whatsoever. He concluded with these words: "Whether the
different parts of the United Kingdom could, under any
circumstances, be formed into a federal state with a feeble central
government, a rigid constitution, and a powerful judiciary is an
enquiry not for lawyers but for statesmen." So it is today, and some
are still enquiring into it. Lawyers, however, have been pointing out
that the existing system is capable of improvement without turning
the United Kingdom into such a federal state as Dicey described.
Under the rule of law as proclaimed by Dicey, the enforcement of
the rights of the individual depended upon the right to sue in the
ordinary courts, and to do that the ordinary citizen needed the
services of a lawyer. Very few could afford it. In 1883 the need for
legal aid in some cases was recognized, but in both civil and
criminal courts what was provided by law was, in general,
niggardly and ineffective' ° and was largely based upon the charity
of lawyers. It was to remain so for another seventy years. Trade
unions filled a large part of the gap through their legal aid benefit,
but there must have been much denial of justice outside their cover.
Since 1949, legal aid has been an established part of our legal
system, as it is in many other countries. The principle behind it is
that legal aid ought to be provided in any proceedings in which legal
representation is necessary in order for access to justice to be equal
and in which it is reasonable to grant it. Financial limits of
eligibility exclude those who are judged able to pay, and those
9. 1 L.Q.R. 80, 95.
10. Rules of action in formal pauperis, enacted by statutes of 1485 and 1551 (11
Hen. VII, c. 12, and 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15), repealed and provision made in 1883 by
Rules of Court for admission of the poor to sue as "poor persons" with the help of
free and unpaid services from lawyers. In crime there was the "dock brief" and aid
later under the Poor Prisoners Defence Act, 1903. See generally, E.J. Cohn, Legal
Aid for the Poor (1943) 59 L.R.Q. 253, and Reports of Committees (1926; Cmnd.

2638) and (1928; Cmnd. 3016).
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limits have themselves caused no little unfairness." Since the
scheme was set up in 1949,12 it has been extended by successive
governments, step by step, so that it now covers almost the whole of
the legal system in the ordinary courts, but only a very small part of
the system within the special and administrative tribunals, which
deal with, among other things, claims to social security benefits.
Our legal aid is based upon the provision to the assisted litigant of
the services of lawyers essentially as if the lawyers were privately
employed, 13 and upon the rule that the litigant with legal aid who
loses can only be required to pay such part of the winner's costs as is
reasonable, having regard to the loser's means.
The provision of legal aid on this basis has made government not
only concerned with, but greatly concerned by, the cost of
providing it. As legal aid is provided in one part of the system, the
injustice of denying it in another similar part becomes uncomfortably apparent. Yet, cost is inevitably a factor for those who decide to
what further parts of the system legal aid can be extended, and in
decisions about how any new or reformed legal scheme should be
structured. For example, instead of providing legal representation
before the Supplementary Benefits Tribunals, before which people
in need claim rights given by welfare laws, can the substantive law
and procedural rules be such, and the tribunals so constituted, that
the absence of professional representation in any contest is acceptable? The Legal Aid Advisory Committee has thought that it is not
acceptable 14 and has recommended that legal aid be made available
in those tribunals. A second example is proceedings for libel or
slander. Only the High Court has jurisdiction over such issues, and
in such cases there is no legal aid.' 5 Distinguished bodies 16 keep
11. Applicant not eligible for legal aid if "disposable"

income is in excess of

J4,400 per annum or if "disposable" capital exceeds 32,725, unless costs of case
likely to be very high. In computing disposable income, allowances are made for
various obligations; for disposable capital, various assets are disregarded, including
a main or only dwelling house. See Legal Aid (Assessment of Resources)
Regulations (1980) S.I. 1980, No. 1630, H.M.S.O. Legal Aid Handbook, 1983.

12. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949.
13. For a discussion of the duty of lawyers acting under a legal aid certificate to
have regard to position of their client's opponent, see Kelly v. LTE (1982) 1
W.L.R. 1055, C. of A.
14. See The Law Society's Report on Legal Aid, 1972-1973; Lord Scarman, The
New Dimension (Stevens: 1974) p. 40.
15. Legal Aid Act, 1974, s. 7(l), and Sch. 1, Pt. 11, para. 1.
16. Faulks Committee on Defamation (1975; Cmnd. 5909) para. 581; Report of

Royal Commission on Legal Services (1979; Cmnd. 7648) para. 13.70.
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saying that it should be made available and that the legal aid
committee could ensure that only cases of real importance would be
litigated at the public's expense. Government has not so far been
moved, 1 7 and who can be surprised'? It is at least a tenable view that
this is a form of relief in which the burden and risk in costs provides
an indispensable check to the abuse of proceedings. 18

II. Civil Procedure
Concern over the cost of providing legal aid has made us aware of
the need for more detailed information as to how the legal system
actually works and when and why cost is incurred. The intuitive
judgment of lawyers, however distinguished, is no longer a
sufficient basis for decisions on procedural reform. Such information will be indispensable for the reappraisal of the whole of our
system of civil justice which is now required. The lessons learned
from operating the legal aid scheme over a period of thirty-four
years will be a good basis on which to start.
The reappraisal that is needed is one of the whole system of civil
justice, not merely of the procedures of the ordinary lawyers'
courts. That ordinary procedure itself has been improved and
refined, but it is recognizably the same structure as that of 1883.
The main change has been the almost complete abandonment of the
civil jury. 19 Few, if any, regret its passing.
Our ordinary court procedure is capable of working with great
speed and efficiency, provided, that is, that no party is determined
to prevent a decision being made quickly. Where there is a real
dispute about facts, we see no effective substitute for the powerful
machinery of adversarial trial. The abiding problem, of course, is
the abuse of procedures: rules which were designed to enable a party
to test evidence on disputed issues of fact are frequently used for the
17. Hansard, British H. of C. debate (7 Dec. 1981) Vol. 14, Written Answers, col.
281.
18. See J.R. Spencer, Criminal Libel -

The Law Commission Working Paper No.

84 (1983) C.L.R. 524 at 527, where it is also argued that extension of legal aid to
defamation would constitute a threat to freedom of speech.
19. A right to a jury is afforded to a party charged with fraud, or to a party in an
action of libel or slander, but there will be no jury even in such cases if the trial will
require prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local
investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury: s. 6(1) of
Administration of Justice (M.P.) Act, 1933. For discretion as to jury trial in other
cases, see Ward v. James (1966) 1 Q.B. 273, and notes to R.S.C. Order 33, r.5, in
Annual Practice, 1982.
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purposes of delay and for intimidating an opponent by the threat of
prohibitive costs of trial. Effective remedies against such abuse
have, so far as I know, hitherto eluded all adversary systems.
We have had many committees of distinguished membership to
examine different parts of our civil procedure, and many
improvements have been made. 20 The users, however, are not
content and the ancient complaints of delay and expense are made
not only by disappointed litigants in the newspapers, but by
successive Presidents of the Law Society. 2 1 One example of a
complaint comes from the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents. In
1982, they complained to the Lord Chancellor that the adversarial
nature and the oral basis of patent litigation in our courts were such
that only the most wealthy of patentees could justify enforcement of
their rights, and that if the cost of patent litigation was not reduced,
the whole concept of the patent system could fail. The complaint
compared our procedures unfavourably with those of other
countries, including Germany. The City of London Solicitors
Company replied with assertions that large patent actions are
unavoidably expensive, though no more expensive than other heavy
litigation, and that changes in our basic procedure could not be
made without reducing the standard of justice achieved. There was,
in short, no apparent cure for this disease. The complaint is notable
because it was made by professional users of legal services.
The Royal Commission on Legal Services reported in 1979 that it
was time for a reappraisal of the operation of the system of justice in

20. Reports of Committees include: Gorrell Committee, Report of the County
Courts Committee, 1909; the two Reports of the Royal Commission on Delay in the

King's Bench Division (1913: Cmnd. 6761) and (1914: Cmnd. 7177): the three
Reports of the Business of the Courts Committee (1933. Cmnd. 4265), (1933:
Cmnd. 4471). (1936: Cmnd. 5066): Report of the Royal Commission on the
Despatch of Business at Common Law (1936: Cmnd. 5065): the two Reports of the
Committee on County Court Procedure (1948: Cmnd. 7468) and (1949: Cmnd.
7668): the four Reports of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and

Procedure (1949: Cnnd. 7764), (1951: Cmnd. 8176), (1952: Cmnd. 8617), and
(1953: Cmnd. 8878): Winn Committee. Report of the Committee on Personal
Injuries Litigation (1968 Cmnd. 3691). Report of the Royal Commission on
Assizes and Quarter Sessions (1969: Cmnd. 4153): Oliver Committee, Report on
Procedure in the Chancery Division ( 1981: Cmnd. 8205). See also the Reports of
Commercial Courts Users Conference, and the Annual Reports of Legal Aid
Advisor' Committee and of the Council of Tribunals. See also Professor Jolowicz,
General Ideas and the Reform of Civil Procedure,supra, note 2.

21. Sir Denis Marshall, 8 Oct. 1981 (1981) L.S. Gazette 1089: (1981) New L.J.
1061: Sir Max Williams, 13 Oct. 1982(1982) L.S. Gazette 1269.
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all civil cases. 22 No such review has yet been commissioned by
government and it is impossible not to feel sympathy for their
hesitation. 2 3 Government must be uneasily regarding this large
structure, which is beautifully made in parts but entirely lacking in
overall design, and they must be wondering where best to begin and
who should start the work. It is argued that we must begin again
with fundamental principles and determine first what our civil
procedure should be designed to do. 24 There is a growing demand
for a right of individuals and of groups to invoke the jurisdiction of
the courts for proceedings not only over private rights, but also in
the public interest. 2 5 It is argued that the court structure, which is
under examination for radical revision, must first be settled. And
alongside the courts, but separate from them, are the special
tribunals, of which there are now more than fifty. 2 6 They already
decide more cases than do the courts, 27 and many of these are
substantial cases of general public importance. Their procedures
differ remarkably from those of the courts. In the Industrial
Tribunals, where claims for compensation for unfair dismissal and
claims under the Equal Pay, Sex Discrimination and Race Relations
29
Acts 28 are decided, the strict rules of evidence are not applied.
There is no legal aid, but, instead of the general rule in our courts
that the loser pays the reasonable costs of both sides, the loser in a
tribunal can only be ordered to pay costs if the proceedings were

22. (Cmnd. 7648) para. 43.3.
23. In November 1983, after the paper was delivered, the British government
announced that: "The Lord Chancellor intends to undertake a complete and
systematic review of civil procedure. The first steps will be a thorough-going
factual and statistical survey of the business management of work at all stages of
civil litigation. The main purpose of the review will be to develop the present

system and, if necessary, to restructure it, in order to achieve the most expeditious,
economical and convenient disposal of business" (1983; Cmnd. 9077).
24. Professor Jolowicz, supra, note 2.
25. Professor Jolowicz, Civil Proceedings in the Public Interest (1982) Cambrian
Law Journal 32, 46.

26. Some 54 tribunals are listed under 33 groups in the First Schedule of the
Tribunals and Enquiries Act, 1971, which act consolidates the acts of 1958 and
1966. These tribunals are under the supervision of the Council of Tribunals.
27. Royal Commission on Legal Services: Final Report (1979; Cmnd. 7648) Vol.

1, para 15.1.
28. For unfair dismissal, see part V, ss. 54 to 80, of the Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act. The other acts mentioned are the Equal Pay Act, 1970, the
Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, and the Race Relations Act, 1976.
29. Philips, J., The Times, 24 Sept. 1977, and (1978) I.C.R. 10.
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frivolous or vexatious. 30 There is no appeal on fact from the
decision of such a tribunal, which consists of a lawyer chairman and
two lay members, but there is an appeal on fact from the decision of
a High Court Judge.
"Industrial Tribunals were set up with the purpose of operating
cheaply, quickly and informally and, as far as possible, it is
desirable that the formalities of the regular court should be
avoided." So said Mr. Justice Phillips in 1977, as President of the
Employment Appeals Tribunal, which was then some six years
old. 3 1 He added: "To introduce a formal system of discovery and
inspection and so on might, in the abstract, produce more perfect
justice but it would be at such great cost in time, money and
manpower that the whole machinery would grind to a halt."

32

It is

odd that we construct a new system of judicature for important
classes of claim and, in devising its procedure, take that of our
regular courts as something to avoid. To the extent that both
systems deal with similar cases, the procedure of one or the other
must be suspect unless the differences are justified by the fact that
the chairman of tribunals sits with two laymen. The inescapable
conclusion is that, in general, government has not had such
confidence in our ordinary procedure of trial by judge alone,
through the adversary process and with the ordinary costs rule and
with legal aid, as to employ it generally in new parts of the law,
even where the disputes produced for resolution are similar in size
and nature to other disputes now handled by the courts. 33 There has
as yet been no general study of the efficiency, cost, and speed of
tribunal proceedings compared with similar cases in the courts, nor
any investigation of what the customers think of the differences. We
need to carry out that study.
It is apparent that we can no longer regard any part of our system
of civil justice with the assumption that the principles of orality, of
30. Rules of Procedure: Industrial Tribunals Regulations, (1974) S.1. 1974, No.
1386, rule 10. See alsoMarlerLtd. v. Robertson (1974) I.C.R. 12.
31. Stone v. CharringtonCo. Ltd. (1977) I.C.R. 248.
32. Cited by D.B. Williams and D.J. Walker, Industrial Tribunals: Practice and
Procedure (Butterworths: 1980) p. 34.
33. For example, claims to unfair dismissal in industrial tribunals are frequently
similar in size and nature to claims for wrongful dismissal in breach of contract in
the ordinary courts. Section 131 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act, 1978 (formerly s. 109 of the Employment Protection Act, 1975), confers
power on the Minister to confer jurisdiction on industrial tribunals in respect of
damages, etc., for breach of contract. To date, the power has not been used.
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the single continuous trial of all issues, and of the general
availability of full adversarial process can continue unmodified. No
doubt we must move by experiment and with caution. I think we
must, however, begin with the belief that the courts should be
trusted, much more than the rules now allow, to determine on what
issues a party should be allowed full use of the adversary process
with oral cross-examination of witnesses.
It is time for us to achieve, as the Victorians tried to achieve in
1883, a unified system of civil justice, providing for each part
procedures most suited for the work to be done and taking the best
forms available. Our lawyers will, no doubt, have to accustom
themselves to the modification of some long-held assumptions.
111. Criminal Evidence and Procedure
As to procedure and evidence in criminal law, for many years
questions have been asked within our system., as in all others, from
the two poles of the argument. One side asks if the scales are not
unfairly weighted against the prosecution and the other side asks
whether vital principles are not endangered by reforms designed to
reduce delay or to remove obstacles to the success of some
prosecutions. Our system of criminal justice works tolerably well in
most cases and for most of the time. There is general confidence in
the jury as the best available method of trying serious crime: it
deals, of course, with about two to three percent of all criminal
business. It is known that a jury, properly directed in law on the
evidence, is capable of being persuaded of the guilt of an accused
who is not guilty of the offence charged, and there have been
expressions of anxiety as to the sufficiency and effectiveness of our
appeal procedures. A verdict is an opaque and unreasoned decision,
even when entirely right. The Lord Chief Justice has announced that
a less strict approach will be adopted toward the admission of fresh
evidence on appeals. 3 4 The main stresses to which the system has
been subjected have been from the result of increasing crime rates
and from a loss of confidence in the fairness of some police officers
in the investigation of crime, particularly in their dealing with
blacks. The rules of criminal law cannot heal social divisions, but
bad methods and manners in the prosecution process can make such
divisions wider.
34. Lord Lane, Lord Chief Justice, reported in The Times, 5 September 1983.
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The questions which I shall mention, relating to rules of
procedure or evidence, are not of great importance in the sense of
affecting the result of a large number of cases. Their importance lies
in the fact that they are rules capable of being changed by
legislation, and not manifestations of social problems. They affect
the way in which the law and the way it works appear to the public
in the vital point of contact, namely, the dealing between the court
and the jury. Wherever the law, in its treatment of the jury, appears
to be technical and lacking confidence in the good sense of the jury
- whether in instructing them in terms which appear illogical,
denying information to them which they reasonably wish to hear,
upsetting their verdicts for reasons which, while right in law, seem
unsubstantial, or asking them to perform feats of intellectual labour
which we and they know are beyond their powers - there the law
risks, even where for good reason it must continue to do so, the loss
of part of the respect and confidence which it ought to command.
The essential principles of our criminal law are the same as a
lawyer would have claimed them to be in 1885. They are the
privilege against involuntary self-incrimination, the placing of the
general onus of proof on the prosecution, and the over-riding
requirement that a trial must be fair. The procedure and the rules of
evidence should be such as are necessary to secure the acquittal of
the innocent, to enable the truth to be established and the guilty to
be convicted, and, lastly, to avoid delays and shorten trials. The
rules by which those principles were served in 1885 were defective.
They are better now, but, given those principles, much remains to
be done.
Continuous work of adjustment has gone on as in all
jurisdictions. Rules devised in one country for serving those
essential principles take very different forms in some other country
that is equally enlightened. In no other subject is the work of
comparative lawyers and historians more valuable for the education
of working lawyers. It seems that the fairness of trials in general
depends far more upon the determination of courts and lawyers
within a system to achieve fairness and upon the integrity of those
engaged in the prosecution process than upon the terms of particular
rules. The rules, however, must command the sufficient confidence
of the community. If rules acquire symbolic value beyond their
rational content, they have to remain until there is sufficient public
confidence, particularly in the prosecution process, for changes to
be made. We have had examples of this with reference to the jury,
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both as to the rules which control its working and as to the evidence
which the jury is permitted to hear and is trusted to weigh. The
symbolic value of some rules has been maintained not only by
public tradition, but also by the conservatism of lawyers who have
loyalty to old rules of which the rational justification is no longer
convincing.
As to the working of the jury, our law does not allow questioning
of jurors before challenge, 35 and there is no support among lawyers
for its introduction. The right of peremptory challenge permits an
accused to exclude any person from the jury whose appearance
suggests lack of sympathy or unwelcome views or capacities, and
the accused may thus select for exclusion as many as the law allows.
The old rules of peremptory challenge were generously fixed in
1825 at twenty-two for each defendant in felony. 3 6 Where juries are
drawn from a homogeneous group, peremptory challenges are not
used much; they are a waste of time. 37 Where the list contains
people of very different backgrounds and attitude, whether of class,
colour, or sectarian allegiance, then challenges are much used.
Those old rules were changed in stages. Peremptory challenges
were reduced to seven in 194938 and to three in 1977. 39 The jury
still consists, as it is supposed to, of twelve people chosen at
random from adults on the electoral roll whose ages are between 18
and 65. But through the changes, the amount of selection which the
accused can achieve was rightly and sharply reduced.
We have also abandoned the long-revered unanimity rule and,
since 1967, have accepted majority verdicts of ten and eleven out of
twelve. 40 The Canadian Law Commission has recently recom-

35. A right of cross-examination of a potential juror arises only where a foundation
of fact has been laid by an accused in support of a ground of challenge see R. v.
Chandler(1964) 48 C.A.R. 143, 15 1, and R. v. Kray (1969) 53 C.A.R. 412.
36. Juries Act, 1825, s. 29.
37. In 1950, Lord Denning, who was at the bar from 1923 to 1944 and a trial judge
from 1944 to 1948, did not recollect a single "challenge" or "standby for the
Crown"; see Reg. v. Sheffield Crown Court, ex p. Brownlow (1980) Q.B. 530;
(1980) 2 A.E.R. 444; 71 C.A.R. 19.
38. Juries Act, 1949. The Canadian Criminal Code, s. 562, states that in murder or
treason, twenty peremptory challenges are allowed; for offences punishable by five
years' imprisonment or over, twelve are allowed; and in others, four.
39. Criminal Law Act, 1977, s. 43.
40. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 13 (now Juries Act, 1974, s. 17); Practice
Direction (1967) 1 W.L.R. 1198.
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mended retention of the unanimity rule in crime, 41 but in Scotland a
simple majority of a jury of fifteen has apparently always been
sufficient 4 2 for purposes which, I am sure, are no more crude than
ours. 4 3 By this change the awesome power of the prejudiced or
irrational juror was reduced and some protection was provided
against the bribing or threatening of a juror. The majority verdict
gives to a joint decision of ten out of twelve the respect which such a
decision deserves, and it has avoided the need in many cases for
retrials. The change has been resisted and criticized, 4 4 but the jury,
I believe, remains trusted by the public under the new rules.
Several parts of our criminal procedure and rules of evidence
were settled as rules of law when the accused had no right to give
evidence, and the rules persisted unchanged long after the accused
was made competent in all cases in 1898. The act of that year
illogically preserved the right of the accused to make a statement
from the dock not on oath about the facts; and juries had to consider
what on earth was meant by a direction that the statement was not
evidence but that they should attach such weight to it as they
thought fit. 45 Long criticized, it was at last abolished by the
Criminal Justice Act, 1982, but even this change had been opposed
46
by many, including the General Council of the Bar.
If a man cannot give sworn evidence to explain why, although
innocent, he chose to give no answer or chose to give only a partial
answer when questioned about an offence, then it is necessary to
deny any evidential value at all to a failure or refusal to answer those
questions. That necessity ceases when he is able to give evidence,
and it has seemed strange to some of us to have to tell a jury, or for a
41. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No. 27 (1980) Report
No. 16, 1982.
42. Renton and Brown, CriminalProcedureAccording to the Law of Scotland (4th
ed., Green and Son Ltd.: 1972) paras. 10 to 40. Professor Walker, Q.C., ed.,
Oxford Companion to Law (1980) p. 687. Professor Walker is Regius Professor at
the University of Glasgow.
43. Scottish criminal law differs in many important respects from that of England
and Wales. Lord MacKay, Lord Advocate, has described it as a hybrid between the
accusatorial common law model and the inquisitorial model of civil law: see his

address to the Howard League, 1983.
44. Justice Deserted (National Council for Civil Liberties: 1979).
45. R. v. Frost and Hale (1964) C.A.R. 284; Archbold, Criminal Pleading:
Evidence and Practice(41 st ed., Sweet & Maxwell: 1982) paras. 4 to 400.
46. This opposition occurred for reasons which Professor Cross called sentimental;
see The Evidence Report (1973) C.L.R. 329. Abolition had been one of the
proposals of the I lth Report of the C.L.R.C., fn. 45.
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magistrate to have to tell himself, that there is no evidential value in
the fact that an alert and intelligent accused failed to mention in the
course of fair questioning a vital fact known to him which, if true,
would have explained circumstances otherwise suggesting guilt. It
is not easy to like a rule which permits use to be made of the
admission of the ashamed, the remorseful, or the stupid offender.
but protects the shameless and self-confident in his silence.
Our Criminal Law Revision Committee thought in 1972 that this
rule was insupportable in today's circumstances, when legal aid is
available, when the understanding and training of law magistrates
and the general level of education of juries are greatly improved,
and when we have the far greater rights of appeal that were
introduced in 1907 and extended in 1968.47 The committee
recommended substantial restriction of this "'right to silence' ,4'and
ar2ued that it should be permissible for the jury or for a magistrates'
court to draw whatever inferences are reasonable from a failure of
the accused, when interrogated, to mention a defence which he puts
forward in his trial, or from a failure to give evidence. Of course,
the, also recommended changes in the requirements of the judges'
rules about cautioning, under which, as soon as a police officer has
evidence which affords reasonable grounds for suspecting that a
person has committed an offence, the officer must tell the person
that he is not obliged to say anything, but that what he does say may
be given in evidence. 49 To many concerned with law reform, the
reception extended to this report (which contained many other
recommendations) was depressing. Professor Cross of Oxford, who
was a member of the committee, described much of the criticism
directed at the Eleventh Report as being characterized by ignorance,
self-righteousness, and unreason. 5 0 Yet, opposition to the restriction of the right to silence was also based upon more formidable
arguments to the effect that no change should be made until
procedures to ensure the fairness and accurate recording of
questioning are available. 5 1 None of the proposals was implemented.
47. Criminal Appeal Act. 1907; Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, s. 2(i)(a): "that the
verdict of the jury should be set aside on the grounds that, under all the
circumstances of the case, it is unsafe or unsatisfactory*'.
48. (1972: Cmnd. 4991) para. 28.
49. Supra. note 45, paras. 14 to 45 et.seq.

50. 1973C.L.R.,p. 329.
51. Debates in House of Lords. 14 Feb. 1973, Vol. 338. cols. 1546-1678.
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Six years after the report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee, the government appointed a Royal Commission to
examine the rights and duties of suspect persons and the criminal
procedure and evidence relating thereto. 52 The commission made its
report in 1981 .3 They found the two predominating philosophies of
perceiving and evaluating the criminal process, those of the
utilitarian and the libertarian, to be so diametrically opposed as to
defy reconciliation. 54 Thus, they set out to formulate proposals
which would strike the proper balance. 55 In the result, some
members of the commission showed sympathy toward the position
taken by the Criminal Law Revision Committee, but the majority
concluded that this part of the existing law should not be altered. 56
It is unlikely that we shall, in the near future, see any proposals that
it should be changed. When we have the results of the extended use
of tape-recorded interrogations and of the implementation of the
other proposals of this commission, including the establishing of a
nation-wide prosecution service so as to reduce police control of the
prosecution of cases, the confidence of the public in the fairness of
questioning may be restored. It will then be time to assert again the
principle that all evidence should be admissible which is relevant in
that it tends to render probable the existence or nonexistence of any
fact on which innocence or guilt depends, and that rules of
exception, by which relevant evidence must be excluded, should be
retained only when shown to be necessary, whether because the
evidence is too unreliable or for valid and overriding reasons of
policy. 57 In deciding whether evidence is too unreliable or too
prejudical to be safely admitted, it is also to be hoped that we will
show greater confidence in the jury. While our lawyers profess to
venerate the jury, they have had but limited faith in its capacity of
judgment. 5 8 Many of our rules of evidence betray an unwillingness
to trust a jury with all the relevant material, even when the issues for

52. The Chairman, Sir Cyril Phillips, and a majority of other members were not
lawyers. Legal members included Lord Justice Eveleigh and W.A.B. Forbes,
Q.C., a Law Commissioner.
53. (Jan. 1981; Cmnd. 8092).
54. (Jan. 1981; Cmnd. 8092) para. 1.29.
55. (Jan. 1981; Cmnd. 8092) para. 1.35.
56. (Jan. 1981; Cmnd. 8092) para. 4.53.
57. C.L.R.C. Eleventh Report (Cmnd. 4991) paras. 14 to 20.
58. Lord Hailsham, Hamlyn Revisited: The British Legal System Today (Stevens:
1983) p. 41.
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decision are within the ordinary experience and understanding of
59
jury members.
There are, however, limits to the capacity of the jury to decide
issues of fact properly, even when all relevant evidence is before
them. There is general confidence in the decisions of juries both
among the public and the judiciary, but there is grave doubt with
reference to one particular class of case, namely, fraud cases of
great complication. There is not a large number of such
prosecutions each year. There would be more if a tribunal were set
up which was capable of understanding the evidence in the most
complicated cases known to the police. With reference to very
complicated commercial transactions, it is impossible to believe that
the jury as a whole properly understands the evidence or the issues.
It will often reach a just result because some jurors - perhaps very
few indeed - will have formed a view and will persuade the rest.
Reason, however, demands that decisions upon cases of very great
complication be made with full comprehension of the evidence and
of its meaning in the commercial context of the transaction.
Anxieties have been expressed about the effective and fair
prosecution of commercial fraud in many jurisdictions. 60 An
alternative form of trial for such cases which has commanded
support is that of a judge with two assessors, who have a
requirement of unanimity to convict, an obligation to produce a
reasoned judgment, and a right of appeal on fact. Such a trial would
be available at the request of the accused or if the judge finds the
case unfit for jury trial by reason of excessive length or
complication. The importance of the proposal is that, if put into
practice, much time and expense would be saved. More
importantly, however, it would be possible to prosecute clever
people who now escape although they are guilty of lucrative frauds,

59. See, for example, the rule which excludes as inadmissible a confession, with
reference to which the Crown cannot prove that it was not obtained by fear or
prejudice or hope of advantage exercised by or held out by a person in authority,
even though any inducement was wholly unlikely to produce an unreliable
confession of the offence in question; see Commissionersof Customs and Excise v.
Harz & Power (1967) 1 A.C. 760, 818, 821. Proposals to change this rule were
included in the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, 1983: evidence of a confession
would be excluded if obtained in consequence of oppression or anything likely to
render a confession unreliable.
60. Dr. Michael Levy, Commercial Frauds (Commonwealth Secretariat: Feb.
1983) Annex. LMM (83) 18.
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and we would stop damaging the concept of the jury trial by asking
such trials to do things which they cannot properly do.
In our system of law, the jury has, of course, important functions
apart from its role as the decider of fact. These functions have been
61
discussed recently by the Law Reform Commission of Canada.
They include representation of the community as a whole in the
decision which determines guilt, and the role of ultimate protector
of the citizen against oppressive enforcement of law. The value of
the jury in these respects, however, does not justify its retention in
cases for which it is unsuitable because of the incapacity of the jury
to retain understanding of a complicated evidence dealing with
unfamiliar concepts over weeks of trial. The government has
announced its intention to appoint a committee to examine this
subject. We must wait and see what happens.
IV. AdministrativeLaw
In 1883 we had no written constitution and no rights able to prevail
against an act of our Sovereign Parliament. We still have neither.
There have been voices of great authority over the years warning us
62
that we need both.
If the rule of law as proclaimed by Dicey was to be effective for
the protection of the rights of the individual against the state, then
our sovereign parliament must at least leave the courts free to
enforce the rule of law. In our system, protection was not sought by
trying to enact legal controls on the sovereignty of Parliament;
rather, it was sought in a sound tradition, both in and outside
Parliament, according to which exclusion of judicial review can be
justified only on the ground of grave emergency, and even then only
so far as can be justified by necessity. 63 The process has been one of
shaming Parliament out of having recourse to unacceptable
legislative devices, by means of both the writings of lawyers 64 and
the admonitions of committees of most distinguished membership,
such as the Donoughmore Committee of 1932 and the Franks
Committee of 1957.65 The preservation of judicial review against
61. Supra, note 41.
62. Recent examples include: Lord Scarman, English Law - The New Dimension
(Stevens: 1974); Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy (1978); and H.W.R.
Wade, Q.C., ConstitutionalFundamentals (Stevens: 1980).
63. Lord McDermott, Protectionfrom Power (Stevens: 1957) pp. 66-67.

64. For example, see Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (Ernest Benn: 1929).
65. (1932; Cmnd. 4060); (1937; Cmnd. 218).
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exclusion by Parliament has been generally successful, but, when
preserved, it protects only against procedural injustice and
illegality; it cannot ensure the substantial justice of administrative
decisions made by government. There has been no attempt to
provide for the examination of administrative decisions on their
merits by judicial process. Parliament decided that reconsideration
on the merits of decisions reached by administration was for
Parliament alone, with the help of the parliamentary commissioner
or ombudsman under our act of 1967.66 We were, of course,
following the ancient institution of the ombudsman in Sweden,
which had been adopted in New Zealand in 1962 and since then in
most common law countries. 6 7 Our ombudsman acts only on
complaints referred to him by members of the House of Commons.
No fees are payable and there is no liability for costs if the
complaint turns out to be unjustified. The ombudsman has powers
to inquire, but he can then do nothing but report. In most cases, any
injustice which is capable of remedy is put right. The system was
extended in 1973 to cover the investigation of the National Health
Service, excluding matters of clinical judgment, 68 and, in 1974, 6to9
cover the investigation of maladministration in local government.
The ombudsman's office is confident, respected, and, it seems, a
permanent part of our system of government. The process is entirely
inquisitorial. It creates no new rights capable of enforcement by any
individual, but the work of the ombudsman has brought satisfaction
to many people whose complaints have been investigated. The
ability to invoke the power of the ombudsman is part of the whole
system of government. The process is entirely inquisitorial. It
creates no new rights capable of enforcement by any individual, but
the work of the ombudsman has brought satisfaction to many people
whose complaints have been investigated. The ability to invoke the
power of the ombudsman is part of the whole system of access to
justice.
Given that Parliament in general has left the courts free to enforce
the rule of law, how have the judges performed? For much of the
66. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967.
67. This institution had also been adopted in many civil law countries, including

France, Italy, Austria, and Spain; see Foulks, Administrative Law (5th ed.,
Butterworths: 1982) pp. 418-419, citing (1974) 90 L.Q.R. 211.

68. National Health Services Reorganization Act, 1973, Part II1, ss. 31-39 (now
Part V of the National Health Service Act, 1977).

69. Local Government Act, 1974.
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period since 1883, the judges did not perform as the system
required. The common law principles which were available for the
task were ignored. The cause of this time of passivity (much harsher
words have been used to describe it) 70 seems to have been a loyal
regard for the judges' duty to defer to the will of Parliament without
an equal determination first to establish, by the application of
principles of law, what it was that Parliament must be treated as
having willed. This unconfident time had begun by 1900 and it was
to last for about fifty years. To Lord Hailsham, our Lord
Chancellor, it looked almost as if the common law had run out of
71
steam.
The return to the confident development of the common law
principles began most recently in 1952, when Lord Goddard
rediscovered error on the face of the record as a ground for
quashing, by certiorari, a decision of a compensation tribunal on
loss of employment by a displaced clerk of a hospital board. 72 The
state which the law had reached is indicated by the argument
advanced by the then Attorney General: even if the tribunal had got
the law wrong in calculating the compensation, he said, and even if
the error was .visible, still certiorari should only lie for want or
excess of jurisdiction. Since Parliament had provided for no appeal
to the courts on a point of law, the clerk would have to put up with
the error. The court set aside the tribunal's decision, and the time of
recovery had begun.
There have now been thirty years of steady creative achievement
by the courts in administrative law. In 1964, led by Lord Reid, a
Scottish Law Lord, in the great case of Ridge v. Baldwin, 73 the
House of Lords reasserted the old principle that the rules of natural
justice applied to all administrative bodies and not only to those
which can be called judicial or quasi-judicial. A Chief Officer of
Police, acquitted by a jury but severely criticized by the trial judge
and dismissed in consequence, was held to be entitled to a hearing
by the Watch Committee before they could lawfully dismiss him.
That decision has had a long and distinguished progeny.
I can mention only a few of the further landmarks of this
progress. In 1968, the Minister of Agriculture was told by the
70. One such description put it as follows: "A dreary catalogue of abdication and
error". See H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (5th ed., Oxford: 1982) p. 18.
71. Supra, note 58 at p. 36.
72. R. v. Northumberland Compensation Tribunal (1952) 1 K.B. 338.
73. (1964) A.C. 40; H.W.R. Wade, supra, note 70, pp. 461-478.
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House of Lords that his apparently unfettered discretion was
conferred by Parliament only for the promotion of the policy and
objects of the act conferring the discretion, and such objects must be
determined by the court by construing the act as a whole. 74 Again in
1968, the claim of crown privilege (now more properly known as
public interest immunity) to prevent examination of documents was
brought under control when the House of Lords established the
power of the court to examine the documents for which privilege
was claimed and to decide for itself whether production should be
ordered, on the balance between any public interest in withholding
the document and the public interest in ensuring the fair
75
administration of justice.
In 1969, the Foreign Compensation Commission rejected a claim
because they thought that the law did not allow it. 76 The act
contained the provision that the determination by the commission of
any application made to them should not be called into question in
any court of law. The Lords recognized their duty to attribute
autonomy of decision to the tribunal within its designated area, but
asserted the counterpart of that autonomy, namely, that the limits of
the area must be accurately observed by the tribunal and, since the
tribunal was wrong in its view of the law, their decision was a
nullity as one made without jurisdiction.
Some of the recent decisions made by the courts have been
received in some quarters with much alarm as invasions of that area
in which the decisions of elected bodies or of a Minister responsible
to Parliament should be unquestioned as matters of policy; a
"blatant and arrogant assumption of power" is one such
description. 7 7 In 1982, on the application of a London Borough, the
court declared illegal, under existing statutes, the cheap fares policy
for London Transport which was funded out of local taxes and put
into effect by the majority party of a newly elected Greater London

74. Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture (1968) A.C. 997. See Lord Reid at p.
1,030.
75. Conway v. Rimmer (1968) A.C. 910; H.W.R. Wade, supra, note 70 at pp.
725-728; Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum C.A. (1980) 2 W.L.R. 367; H.L. (1980)
1 W.L.R. 627.
76. Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Tribunal (1969) 2 A.C. 147. See
also H.W.R. Wade, supra, note 70 at pp. 263-267 and pp. 603-606.
77. Professor Griffith, Administrative Law and the Judges, Pritt Memorial

Lecture: 1978 (Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, London: 1978) p. 20.
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Council in performance of their election policy. 8 ln another case,
the Secretary of State for Education intervened to require a local
authority to implement central government's policy of comprehensive education, on the statutory ground that the Secretary was
satisfied that the local authority was acting unreasonably in failing
to do so. No one doubted the honesty of the Secretary of State's
belief in the unreasonableness of the local authority's policy, but the
court said that he had, on the facts, no valid ground for holding the
belief having regard to the true meaning in the law of
"unreasonableness". 79 There has been great clamour about such
decisions. There is a well-developed scepticism about the reliability
of judicial judgment when it appears to impinge on social policy,
but there is no general rejection of the idea of judicial review of the
legality of the actions of such public bodies.
The procedural rules for judicial review, which control access to
that remedy, were also in need of urgent reform. 8 0 Following the
leads given in other common law countries, including the United
States, 8 1 New Zealand, 8 2 and Canada, 83 new rules of court gave us,
in 1977, the single application for judicial review, 8 4 namely, a
flexible comprehensive code for the supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court. Most importantly, this new procedure preserved the old
requirement that leave to start such proceedings needed to be given
by the courts; for ordinary actions, of course, no leave is required.
The claimant for judicial review will get leave only if he puts an
arguable case before the court promptly and on affidavit. 8 5 The
78. Bromley LBC v. Greater London Council (1982)

2 W.L.R. 62, Court of

Appeal and House of Lords.
79. Secretary of State for Education v. Thameside M.B.C. (1977) A.C. 1014.

80. Lord Denning described the procedure of the prerogative order in 1949 as
being as useful for winning freedom as a pick and shovel for winning coal; see
Freedom under the Law (Stevens: 1949) p. 126.

81. "Petition for Review" procedure, Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat.
720, 1914, 15 USCA, s. 45(c), cited in Law Commission, Working Paper No. 40,

para. 75.
82. New Zealand Judicature Amendment Act, 1972.

83. Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971.
84. Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53, S.I. 1977, No. 1955. Before this
reform, the remedies employed in administrative law belonged to "two families"
- that of ordinary private law remedies, such as damages, injunction, and
declaration, and the public law remedies of certiorari, etc. Prerogative remedies
could not be claimed in an ordinary action. By the new procedure of judicial
review, remedies in both families can be claimed. See H.W.R. Wade, supra, note
70 at p. 16.

85. Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53, r. 3 and 4.
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purpose of the rule is to protect public authorities from the
disturbance and uncertainty which would be caused if misconceived
applications could be left pending. s 6 The effect of the rule, when
considered against ordinary proceedings, is striking: at the outset of
the case the court is given the evidence on which the applicant
relies, and the judges are required to decide, on the basis of that
information, upon what issues, if any, the applicant will be
permitted to require an answer from the respondent and to use
against him the adversarial procedures of discovery and of
cross-examination of witnesses. The rule is meant to preserve
proper access to justice, while effectively limiting the abuse of legal
proceedings.
But the law, as it was, allowed the claimant a choice: he could go
by writ for an injunction or declaration without leave. In November
1982, the House of Lords completed the procedural reform on this
point whereon the new rules were silent8 7 by holding that, as a
general rule, to which the necessary exceptions would have to be
worked out case by case, it would be contrary to public policy and
an abuse of the process of the court to permit a person to proceed by
way of an ordinary action when he is seeking to establish that the
decision of a public authority has infringed rights to which he was
entitled by public law. 88 Appreciation of the distinction between
public and private law has been a latecomer to our legal system.8 9 It
is bound to pose a large number of subtle and difficult questions for
us, 90 and we do not yet know how well it will work in controlling
abuse, but preserving the necessary access to justice.
V. The Law of the Constitution
Our system has thus, in its latest years, regenerated its powers.
We have got the basis for a system of administrative law and we

86. R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. (1982) Q.B. 407; 1982 A.C. 617: per Lord
Diplock at p. 643 at A.
87. The new s. 31 of the Supreme Court Act, 198 1, was also silent on this point.
88. O'Reilly v. Mackman C.A. (1982) 3 W.L.R. 604, and H.L. (1982) 3 W.L.R.
1096.
89. O'Reilly v. Mackman per Lord Diplock (1982) 3 W.L.R. 1096, at p. 1102E.
90. See Cox v. Thanet D.C. (1982) 3 W.L.R. 1121. See also C. Harlow, Public
and Private Law: Definition without Distinction: The Doctrine of Exclusivity
(1980) 43 M.L.R. 241; and Jeremy McBride, Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 2, p.
268.
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have an effective procedure, supported by a legal aid scheme. But
until 1966, there was no form of legal process by which the actions
of the executive could be questioned if those actions were justified
by the domestic law passed by Parliament.
The United Kingdom had ratified in 1951,91 as a member of the
Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights.
The main provisions, including the rights of life, liberty, due
process in criminal proceedings, and freedom of expression and
association, are familiar to everyone. The First Protocol declares
that every person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions, subject to exceptions of wide generality in favour of
state control in the public interest. The United Kingdom ratified this
addition in 1952. A Fourth Protocol, which provided for rights of
free movement out of and into the territory of the state of which any
person is a national, was also signed in 1952, but the United
Kingdom has never ratified it because of possible inconsistency
with its immigration rules.
Ratification of the Convention and acceptance of the jurisdiction
of the court would expose the United Kingdom to the risk of being
judged by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg to
have contravened the provisions of the Convention. No one thought
that there was any risk of that. 9 2 The government could also have
provided for incorporation of the Convention into the domestic law
of the United Kingdom, but it did not do so. Incorporation would
have required provision for resolving conflicts between the
Convention and existing and future legislation, and established rules
of common law, and such conflicts were not expected.
The United Kingdom having thus assumed by treaty an obligation
to comply with the European Convention, but having made no
alteration to its domestic law in consequence, acceded in January
1973 to the European Communities. 9 3 As a result, all applicable
Community law, which does not include the Convention, has legal
effect within the United Kingdom without any further procedure to
incorporate it. 9 4 In the event of any conflict between our domestic
law and Community law, it is Community law which prevails.
When the legislation was introduced into Parliament, it was said
that nothing in the act would abridge the ultimate sovereignty of
91.
92.
93.
94.

(1953; Cmnd. 8969).
Lord Elwyn Jones, L.C., Debates in House of Lords, 3 Feb. 1977, Vol. 379.
European Communities Act, 1972.
European Communities Act, 1972, s. 2.
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Parliament, 9 5 and that is true, because Parliament could repeal the
acts for our law, even if the United Kingdom were thereby put in
breach of its international obligations. Community law is concerned
mainly with economic matters and when applicable may afford a
right to the individual which is superior to the right provided by
domestic law. 9 6 But it has no general provisions in the nature of a
Bill of Rights.
In 1978, the statesmen tried, by means of the Scotland Act and
the Wales Act passed in that year, not to form a federal state in the
United Kingdom, but to devolve legislative powers over defined
subjects upon separate assemblies in Scotland and Wales while
retaining the Scottish and Welsh members in the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. In England, with 85 percent of the population and
more than 85 percent of the economic power, there was to be no
separate assembly. 9 7 The scheme contained no Bill of Rights nor
any entrenched limitation upon the power of Parliament itself. 98 On

I March 1979, this form of devolution failed on referendum to pass
the test of sufficient acceptance, receiving only faint praise in
Scotland and blunt rejection in Wales. 99
And so the domestic law of the constitution is, in substance, as it

was in 1885. If the Convention was not to be part of our domestic
95. Sir Geoffrey Rippon, 831 H. of C. Debates 278, 15 Feb. 1972, cited by D.M.
Clark and D.E. Sufrin in "Constitutional Conumdrum", p. 32, in Furmston, M.P.,
Kerridge, R., and Suffrin, B.E., eds., The Effect on English Domestic Law of
Membership of the E.E.C. and of Ratification of the European Convention of
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 1983). 1 am indebted to all the essays
in this book for much of this part of this paper.
96. Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board (1982) C. of A., 3
W.L.R. 514; petition for leave to appeal allowed: (1982) 3 W.L.R. 523C. See also
articles 85 and 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty.
97. Provision was made for determination of legislative competence of Scottish
Acts in the Privy Council and for judicial review of acts of the Welsh Assembly in
the courts of England and Wales; see Scotland Act, 1978, s. 19, and Wales Act,
1978, s. 70.
98. The scheme took notice of the obligations of the United Kingdom under
European Community Law and international law, including the European
Convention of Human Rights, and empowered the Secretary of State for Scotland
and for Wales to intervene with reference to acts of either assembly which touched
such obligations; see Scotland Act, 1978, s. 19, and Wales Act, 1978, s. 34.
99. The voting was as follows (percentages refer to numbers entitled to vote):
Scotland, yes: 1,230,937, or 32.85 percent, and no: 1,153,502, or 30.78 percent;
Wales, yes: 243,048, or 11.9 percent, and no: 956,330, or 46.9 percent. Because
the requirement was 40 percent in favour (see Scotland Act, 1978, s. 85, and Wales
Act, 1978, s. 80), the acts were repealed. See the Rt. Hon. Lord Murray,
Devolution in the U.K.: A Scottish Perspective (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 35.
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law -

and it still is not -

the government could, if it chose, grant

the right of individual petition to Strasbourg under Article XXV on
complaint of breach of the Convention by the United Kingdom.
This right was not granted until 1966, in an action taken by a Labour
Administration with Lord Gardiner as Lord Chancellor. At the same
time, the government accepted the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights. The right of individual petition has since
then been renewed for short periods of years by successive
governments. The right is, thus, truly precarious and depends upon
renewal by executive action.
Things did not turn out precisely as expected. The United
Kingdom has been adjudged to be in breach of its obligations under
the European Convention in a number of cases which I can only call
large. Government has, no doubt, found these events both
surprising and embarrassing. Breach was established in a case about
the working of the closed shop in our nationalized railways for
which damages totalling 375,000 and costs of 365,000 were
awarded to three claimants. 10 0 There have been cases, many of
which were settled in the commission, about immigration. Breaches
have also been established on individual petitions in other contexts,
such as the use of corporal punishment in a school without the
consent of parents, 10 1 the censorship of mail by prison authorities
10 2
and the refusal of permission for a prisoner to seek legal advice,
and the working of the common law of contempt against The
Sunday Times newspaper in its investigation and reporting of the
Thalidomide case.

10 3

In one case, Eire v. U.K., the proceedings

were between two parties to the Convention. It was alleged that the
authorities in Northern Ireland had inflicted torture on Republican
prisoners by using a number of interrogative devices, such as
wallstanding, subjection to noise, and deprivation of sleep. The
court held that the techniques did not amount to torture, but were
inhumane and degrading treatment in breach of Article 111.104

100. Young, James and Webster v. U.K., Publications of the Court of Human
Rights, Series A, Volume 44(1981) I 1.R.L.R. 408.
101. Campbell and Cosans v. U.K., Council of Europe, Human Rights News,
Press Release C. 81/43 and C. 82/57.
102. Silver and Others v. U.K., 5947/82.

103. Application No. 6538/74, adopted 18 May 1977 (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245.
104. 5310/71 and 5451: Year Book 21, p. 602, cited by Gillian Douglas and
Stephen Jones, in Furmston, Kerridge, and Suffrin, supra, note 95 at p. 532.
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The response of the government to these and other decisions has
been to discontinue the offending practices, often before decision by
the court, and, when necessary, to change the relevant law, such as
prison rules. There has been no sign of an intention to defy the
decisions of the court, although not everyone agrees with the
interpretation of the Convention by the various majorities in the
Court of Strasbourg. The United Kingdom could denounce the
Convention on six months' notice under Article LXV if it found the
interpretation of the Convention by the decisions of the majority of
the court to be wholly unacceptable. It has not done so and such a
step is exceedingly improbable. In 1981, chastened but not
dismayed, the government renewed the right of individual petition
for five years.
There has long been discussion at home of the need for enactment
of a Bill of Rights, much of it inspired by the first Canadian Bill of
Rights of 1960.105 An attempt was made in 1978 to incorporate the
European Convention into our domestic law by ordinary statute. It
failed. All of the arguments on both sides, with which Canadians
are now so familiar, were advanced and refuted. Those then in
favour of incorporation, including Lord Hailsham and Lord
Scarman, recognized that the benefits to be gained by such a step
were modest: it is impossible for us to entrench a Bill of Rights
against being repealed or overridden without a new constitutional
resettlement which is widely favoured but seen to be far out of
reach. The modest gains promised are, however, valuable in the
view of lawyers. The justified claimant would get relief much more
quickly. Our courts would use the case law developed by the court
at Strasbourg and would usefully add to its development. Our courts
would be given the opportunity to mould the general concepts
contained in the Convention into more particular terms suited to our
society and law. There would be fewer cases against the United
Kingdom in the court at Strasbourg. Those gains, if they are to be
had, must wait until they seem so attractive to Parliament that they
prevail over the arguments of other distinguished senior judges,
including Lords Diplock, Morris, and Elwyn-Jones. Those against
incorporation feared grave uncertainty in our law from the risk of
challenge to any rule or public action. Some disliked asking judges
105. See Legislation on Human Rights (Home Office Discussion Document: June

1976), and Minutes of Evidence taken before Select Committee on a Bill of Rights,
Nov. 1977, House of Lords, Sessions 1976-77 and 1977-78 (81).
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to make what might be decisions of a political nature. Some were
apprehensive of a flood of litigation. So much work for lawyers
would cause us to have as many of the breed as now bless the United
States, and in the matter of lawyers, the argument assumes that
06
fewer is better. 1
The present arrangements are, thus, likely to continue for some
time. It must be acknowledged that they are odd. We allow anyone
to proceed against the United Kingdom and we accept the decisions
on his complaint of a court of foreign jurists - now twenty-one
judges in the Plenary Court - leavened, if that be the word, by one
British member. We do not allow our own judges to pass judgment
upon the complaint of breach of the Convention before it goes to
Strasbourg. Odd or not, the effect so far has been satisfactory:
scrutiny of rules and practices against the rights stated in the
Convention has resulted in some clear gains for human rights, with
no damage to anything but pride. Government has been made more
vigilant to see that such rights are not impaired through
inadvertence. We have brought into our legal system, at one
remove, a Bill of Rights with recourse through the commission and,
if it agrees, to an increasingly confident court at Strasbourg. No
government is likely to incur the grave embarrassment of trying to
expel it entirely. This innovation of international supervision over
the compliance by a sovereign state with its promises about human
rights has been shown to be effective. Some say that the Convention
is itself in need of expansion and repair, but, such as it is, it has
been made to work. 10 7 We can be modestly pleased about that, as
we can be modestly proud of the fact that the general response of the
United Kingdom to adverse decisions of the European Court has not
been that of outraged pride, but of acceptance of the court's
judgments. While as lawyers we are respectful and envious of the
achievement of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, with the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms therein, we do not expect soon to
see in the United Kingdom enactment of a Bill of Rights in any way
protected against repeal or subsequent impairment. In May 1983,
Lord Hailsham, whose experience both as lawyer and politician

106. Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, P.D. Lords, Vol. 379, 3 Feb. 1977, col. 990, and
Vol. 396, 29 Nov. 1978, col. 1325.
107. Cedric Thornberry, Governor of British Institute of Human Rights,
Memorandum of Evidence, Select Committee, House of Lords, Minutes of
Evidence, Nov. 1977, p. 224 at 226.
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gives great authority to his words, said that if the British people ever
come to accept limited government by some form of devolution or
by incorporation of a Bill of Rights, it would be piecemeal and then
only as a result of crisis. 10 8 It is, however, reasonable to hope that,
before very long, when we have worked out procedures for, and
acceptable limitations upon, judicial review for these purposes,
Parliament may be persuaded to take the provisions of the European
Convention, with which our government has already promised other
states that it will comply, and by ordinary repealable statute make it
part of our own law. We shall hope that arguments to persuade our
Parliament to such a course will be found from the experience and
achievements of the courts of Canada under the terms of your
Charter.

108. Hamlyn Revisited (Stevens: 1983) p. 29.

